Here’s a list of scientific articles to dispel the notion that muh economy is a valid argument for mass immigration in first world countries.
In short, there is NO evidence that mass-immigration is beneficial for the economy. Any argument in favor of it should not pertain to economics.
If the proponents of mass-immigration are motivated by altruism and the dissolution of Western culture, they should say so. Not spread lies about how our economy needs mass-immigration.
Here are the articles, with their abstracts.
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The Economic Effects of Immigration into the United Kingdom (Link to article)
This article is concerned with the economic effects of immigration. The emphasis is on Britain, but extensive material is also provided on other countries. Since 1997 a new British immigration policy has displaced previous policy aims, which were focused on minimizing settlement. Large-scale immigration is now seen as essential for Britain’s economic well-being, and measures have been introduced to increase inflows. The benefits claimed include fiscal advantages, increased prosperity, a ready supply of labor, and improvements to the age structure. Fears that large-scale immigration might damage the interests of unskilled workers are discounted. This article examines these claims. It concludes that the economic consequences of large-scale immigration are mostly minor, negative, or transient, that the interests of more vulnerable sections of the domestic population may well be damaged, and that any economic benefits are unlikely to bear comparison with immigration’s probable substantial and permanent demographic and environmental impact. Our claims are in line with those from other developed countries.
The conclusion we draw from this literature is that immigration of unskilled workers harms local workers who compete with them, possibly to a large extent.
This article has examined the impact of immigration on citizens of the United Kingdom. The claim that large-scale immigration will be of great economic benefit to them is false. Some will gain, but others will lose. With respect to the existing population of the UK and their descendants, the purely economic consequences of large-scale immigration could be negative or positive, but either way they will be small.
Immigrants are the only unequivocal economic beneficiaries of migration. There is no guarantee that anyone else will be, not even the sending countries from which the migrants come.
Explaining why the UK government is embarking on a policy with such potentially radical social and demographic consequences for so little and uncertain material benefit for its own citizens is beyond the scope of this article. All that can be shown here is that immigration on the current scale can only be justified on grounds other than its economic advantage to the citizens of the UK.
The Economic Benefits from Immigration (link to article)
Natives benefit from immigration mainly because of production complementarities between immigrant workers and other factors of production, and these benefits are larger when immigrants are sufficiently `different’ from the stock of native productive inputs. The available evidence suggests that the economic benefits from immigration for the United States are small, on the order of $6 billion and almost certainly less than $20 billion annually. These gains, however, could be increased considerably if the United States pursued an immigration policy which attracted a more skilled immigrant flow.
(To put it into context, $6 billion is 1/100th of the annual military spending in the United States, or 1/500th of the annual health spending. Basically, it’s nothing.)
The Impact of Immigration on the Social Security System (Link to article)
In 1992, the estimated deficit of the entire Social Security System attributable to the foreign born was $2.7 billion (i.e., payments the foreign born paid to and received from the system). Also in 1992, there was an estimated surplus of $19.0 billion for the native born population. During the 1993-2002 decade, the $2.7 billion annual deficit attributable to the current stock of immigrants is projected to grow by about one percent annually in present value terms, reaching $2.98 billion yearly in 2002. The ten-year deficit for the 1993-2002 decade would amount to nearly $30.0 billion in 1993 dollars. In policy terms, the addition of large numbers of less skilled foreign workers to the labor force (which will occur if there is no change in immigration law or enforcement policy) in the hope of bolstering the solvency of the Social Security System would in fact have the opposite effect.
Immigration, social security, and broader fiscal impacts (Link to article)
“the overall fiscal consequences of altering the volume of immigration would be quite small and should not be a consideration for policy”
Immigration and the Dutch Economy (Link to article)
Taking into account the fact that immigrants usually have families, their longterm fiscal impact turns out to be practically zero. Thus, immigration will not solve the budgetary problem. This calculation assumes that immigrants show the same economic performance as the average Dutch resident. If, however, their average employment rate and income were lower, as it is for the present non-Western immigrant population, immigration would aggravate rather than alleviate the financial burden of ageing. Only if immigrants outperform the average Dutch resident on the labour market, will their fiscal impact be clearly positive. However, assuming we would be able to attract these high performers, it would still take millions of them to make a substantial contribution to the required budgetary adjustment. Given these findings, immigration does not seem to be an effective way to alleviate the financial burden of ageing.
The Developed World’s Demographic Transition – The Roles of Capital Flows, Immigration, and Policy (Link to article)
Specifically, can the developed economies hope to be bailed out by either macroeconomic feedback effects of by increased migration? To address these questions, this paper develops and simulates a dynamic, intergeneration, and interregional demographic life-cycle model. The model has three regions the U.S. Japan which exchange goods and capital. The model features immigration, age-specific fertility, life span extension, life span uncertainty, bequests arising from incomplete annuitization, and intra-cohort heterogeneity. Other things equal, one would expect the aging of the developed economies to increase capital per worker as the number of suppliers of capital (the old) rises relative to the number of suppliers of labor (the young). But given the need to pay the elderly their benefits, other things are far from equal. According to our simulations, the tax hikes needed to finance benefits along the demographic transition path generate a major capital shortage that lowers real wages by 19 percent and raises real interest rates by over 400 basis points. Hence, far from mitigating the developed world’s fiscal problems, macroeconomic feedback effects make matters significantly worse. The simulations also show that increased immigration does very little to mitigate the fiscal stresses facing the developed world.
The Role of Immigration in Dealing with the Developed World’s Demographic Transition (Link to article)
This paper develops a three-region dynamic general-equilibrium life-cycle model to analyze general and skill-specific immigration policy in the U.S., Japan, and the E.U. Immigration is often offered as a solution to the remarkable demographic transition underway in the developed world. However, the precise net impact of expanded immigration is quite unclear. Additional immigrants pay taxes, but they also require public goods and become eligible for social security programs. Since taxes and transfer payments are collected and distributed on a progressive basis, high-skilled immigrants deliver a larger bang for the buck when it comes to paying net taxes. Our model confirms this point. Nonetheless, its findings are not pretty. It shows that a significant expansion of immigration, whether across all skill groups or among particular skill groups, will do remarkably little to alter the major capital shortage, tax hikes, and reductions in real wages that can be expected along the demographic transition.
Ageing, Immigration, and Fiscal Sustainability (Link to article)
This reduction explains why the reduced immigration has a positive effect on fiscal sustainability. The necessary adjustment in fiscal expenditures reduces to 1.4 percent of GDP – a reduction of 0.4 percentage points compared to the baseline scenario. Compared to the very large macroeconomic and demographic effects this improvement of fiscal sustainability is almost negligible.
Immigration and the public sector: Income effects for the native population in Sweden (Link to article)
The immigrants’ age structure and labour market situation are major determinants for their net contribution to the public sector. During the 50s, 60s and the 70s the immigrants’ net contributions gave positive income effects for the native Swedes. Nowadays there are negative income effects due to the deteriorating employment situation among the immigrants. The yearly positive or negative income effects have at most been 1–2% of the gross national product. A change in the immigrants’ employment rate by 1 percentage unit will change their yearly net contribution to the public sector by 0.1% of the gross national product.
Friends or strangers: the impact of immigrants on the U.S. economy (Link to article)
This book analyzes the immigrant’s role in the American economy….The essence of the empirical evidence summarized here is that because of changes in U.S. immigration policy and because of changing economic and political conditions both here and abroad, the United States is currently attracting relatively unskilled immigrants. For the most part, these immigrants have little chance of attaining economic parity with natives during their lifetimes. Although these immigrants do not greatly affect the earnings and employment opportunities of natives, they may have an even greater long-run economic impact because of their relatively high poverty rates and propensities for participation in the welfare system and because national income and tax revenues are substantially lower than they would have been if the United States had attracted a more skilled immigrant flow….The final section of the book….compares the foreign-born populations in the United States with the foreign-born populations in two other host countries (Australia and Canada) and documents how changes in policy and economic conditions alter the sorting of immigrant skills among host countries. Data are from official U.S. sources and censuses from Australia and Canada.
Fiscal Implications of Immigration—A Net Present Value Calculation (Link to article)
Focusing on the net fiscal effects, the gain from admitting immigrants is computed for a welfare state with large expenditures and a large tax burden (Sweden). Prices and behavior are held constant, which allows a detailed analysis of the effects of immigration. The present value of future tax revenues minus outlays is potentially large; USD 23,500 per young working-age immigrant, but an average new immigrant represents a net government loss of USD 20,500. The dominant factors are employment rates and age. For young working-age immigrants, the “break-even” participation rate for which the gain would be zero is 60%, well below the empirical rate for this group.
These results suggest that immigrants to a typical welfare state such as Sweden impose, on average, a substantial fiscal burden, and are less beneficial for public coffers than immigrants to the US.
The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK (Link to article)
We investigate the fiscal impact of immigration on the UK economy, with a focus on the period since 1995. Our findings indicate that, when considering the resident immigrant population in each year from 1995 to 2011, immigrants from the European Economic Area (EEA) have made a positive fiscal contribution, even during periods when the UK was running budget deficits, while Non-EEA immigrants, not dissimilar to natives, have made a negative contribution. For immigrants that arrived since 2000, contributions have been positive throughout, and particularly so for immigrants from EEA countries. Notable is the strong positive contribution made by immigrants from countries that joined the EU in 2004.
Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher Immigration (Link to article)
This paper uses 1990 Census data to study the effects of immigrant inflows on the labor market opportunities of natives and older immigrants. I divide new immigrants, older immigrants, and natives into distinct skill groups and focus on skill-group-specific outcomes within cities. An important first question is” whether inflows of new immigrants lead to outflows of natives or earlier immigrants in the same skill groups. Even after accounting for endogenous mobility decisions I find that inter-city migration flows of natives and older immigrants are largely” unaffected by new immigrant inflows. Inflows of new immigrants are associated with lower employment rates among natives and earlier immigrants, but with relatively small effects on the relative wage structure. The estimates imply that immigrant arrivals between 1985 and 1990 depressed the employment rate of low-skilled natives in major U.S. cities by 1-2 percentage points on average, and by substantially more in high-immigrant cities.
Protective or counter-productive? labour market institutions and the effect of immigration on eu natives (Link to article)
Reduced labour market flexibility may protect some native workers from immigrant competition but can increase negative effects on equilibrium employment. This motivates an analysis of immigration effects interacted with institutions. OLS estimates for European countries show small, mostly negative immigration effects while an IV strategy based on immigrants from former Yugoslavia generates larger though mostly insignificant negative estimates. Specifications allowing interactions between immigration and measures of labour and product market rigidity are consistent with the view that reduced flexibility increases negative immigration effects. The estimates typically imply more native job losses in countries with restrictive institutions, especially restricted product markets.
Since many immigrants work, their jobs may well have come at the expense of natives.
On a per-worker basis, this implies that 100 immigrants in the labour force cost about 83 native jobs, a large effect in levels.
Cited as: ”The effect is greatest in countries where local workers enjoy the most job protection. In such countries, employers cannot easily dismiss existing workers, but when filling new jobs they may choose immigrants because they are easier to fire than native workers. The authors conclude that more labor-market “flexibility” would reduce unemployment among local workers. If employers could easily dismiss local workers, they would have no reason to prefer immigrants. Thus, immigration leads either to unemployment or to greater job insecurity for local workers. In each case, workers lose and employers gain.”
The fiscal impact of immigration on the advanced economies (Link to article)
This paper is concerned with the advanced economies. It begins with a discussion of the demographic issues that have played such a large role in the debate on immigration. This is followed by a section on the main problems involved in estimating the fiscal impact of immigration and then a summary of the international evidence on this topic, mostly from Europe and America. Separate sections on the UK and on low-fertility countries follow. The main conclusions are as follows. Highly skilled migrants normally make a large fiscal contribution, whereas unskilled migrants are likely to impose a net cost on native taxpayers if they settle in the receiving country. However, even unskilled migrants may be net contributors if they eventually depart and make few claims on government expenditure while in the country. Most empirical studies find that the fiscal contribution of the immigrant population as a whole is quite small. The positive contribution of some migrants is largely or wholly offset by the negative contribution of others. This finding holds across a variety of countries and methodologies. Estimates of the net fiscal contribution of immigration normally lie within the range ±1 per cent of GDP. There are a few exceptions, but these refer to countries experiencing demographic collapse and they are based on unrealistic assumptions about the inter-generational allocation of future taxes and government expenditure. With more realistic assumptions, the overall fiscal benefit of immigration is quite small, even in these countries. These findings suggest that, in general, there is no strong fiscal case for or against sustained large-scale immigration. The desirability or otherwise of large-scale immigration should be decided on other grounds.
The labor market impact of immigration in Western Germany in the 1990s (Link to article)
In this article we estimate the wage and employment effects of recent immigration in Western Germany. Using administrative data for the period 1987–2001 and a labor-market equilibrium model, we find that the substantial immigration of the 1990s had very little adverse effects on native wages and on their employment levels. Instead, it had a sizeable adverse employment effect on previous immigrants as well as a small adverse effect on their wages. These asymmetric results are partly driven by a higher degree of substitution between old and new immigrants in the labor market and in part by the rigidity of wages in less than flexible labor markets. In a simple counter-factual experiment we show that in a world of perfect wage flexibility and no unemployment insurance the wage-bill loss of old immigrants would be much smaller.
Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences (Link to article)
This paper reviews immigration trends and their economic impacts in a number of OECD countries. While migration systems present similarities across countries, institutional arrangements vary widely and impact on the size and composition of migration flows. Some of the main factors driving immigration are then briefly discussed. The paper also considers the economic, fiscal and social implications of immigration. The study suggests that immigration can confer small net gains to the host country. However, the benefits are not necessarily evenly distributed and some groups, in particular those whose labour is substitutable with immigrants may lose, calling for a smooth working of labour and product markets in OECD countries. The paper also claims that, while migration can partly offset slower growing or declining OECD populations, it cannot provide by itself a solution to the budgetary implications of ageing populations.
Will Future Immigration to Sweden Make it Easier to Finance the Welfare System? (Link to article)
Will future immigration to a country with a large public sector alleviate the increasing burden on the public welfare system due to an ageing population? The question is based on the experience that the age structure of immigrants differs from that of the native population. Fiscal impacts due to immigration depend mainly on the size, the age composition and the labour market integration of the additional population which arises because of immigration. A projection from Statistics Sweden about future immigration combined with the latest Long-Term Survey of the Swedish Economy has been used in this study. Calculations for Sweden up to the year 2050 show that the positive net contribution to the public sector from the additional population is rather small even with good integration into the labour market. The reason is that future immigration will increase the size of the population and thereby raise not only revenue from taxation but also public expenses. The fiscal impact is sensitive to the labour market integration of the additional population. The yearly positive/negative net contribution effect is less than 1% of GDP for most of the years. On the whole, the results are about the same even if we change the assumptions concerning the composition of future public revenues, the growth of public expenses, return migration, or the age-specific birth and death rates in the additional population. More considerable net fiscal effects would require a much higher and probably unrealistic level of future immigration.
The Fiscal Effects of the New Immigration in Switzerland (Link to article)
Our research investigates the long-term fiscal effects of the so-called new immigration of high-skilled workers in Switzerland for the first time. We develop a new approach, which combines the strengths of the two methods that are known in the literature. In line with the dynamic approach, we project the future composition of the foreign population in Switzerland, using the current propensities of immigrants with different characteristics to settle in Switzerland, and then link this structure based on the static approach with current tax, contribution, transfer and benefit flows of foreigners with the same characteristics. It is therefore a ceteris paribus comparison that shows what effect the new immigration in Switzerland has on the fiscal balance of foreigners in the long run due to changes in the composition of the immigrant flow and the varying tendencies of immigrants to settle in Switzerland under otherwise identical conditions. The results indicate that the fiscal incidence of the new immigration has a negative long-term trend. In doing so, this investigation provides evidence that the future improvement of the skill level of foreigners, which should influence the fiscal balance positively, is too weak to compensate the expected negative fiscal effects of the trend towards an aging society.
The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK 2014/15 (Link to article)
This paper extends the original research by Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini (Dustmann and Frattini 2014) on the fiscal impact of immigration to the UK in individual years from 1995 to 2011 by applying the same methodological principles to the most recent year for which equivalent data is available – fiscal 2014/15.
The broad findings are that the overall fiscal effect in 2014/15 of the immigrant population in the UK was negative. This was so for post-2000 arrivals too using Dustmann and Frattini’s categorisation of sub-population groups, with negative contributions by immigrants from the EU A10 group of countries and countries outside the EEA outweighing a positive contribution by immigrants from the EU15/other EEA countries. This is the same result as obtained by Dustmann and Frattini in the final year of the period they observed.
The aging population and the size of the welfare state (Link to article)
An important consideration for our analytical result that the tax rate may be negatively related to the dependency ratio is the fact that in the model (and typically in reality), redistribution is financed by a tax on labor income rather than on capital income. If in our setup a capital income tax were available as a source of revenue to finance social security benefits, and this made retirees net contributors to the fiscal system rather than net beneficiaries, the tax rate would then be positively related to the dependency ratio (until the weight of capital owners in the population becomes large enough to shift the tax burden onto labor income).
(What this means is that states offering more welfare attract a lesser skilled migrant population, while pushing away skilled migrants)
The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market (Link to article)
Immigration is not evenly balanced across groups of workers that have the same education but differ in their work experience, and the nature of the supply imbalance changes over time. This paper develops a new approach for estimating the labor market impact of immigration by exploiting this variation in supply shifts across education-experience groups. I assume that similarly educated workers with different levels of experience participate in a national labor market and are not perfect substitutes. The analysis indicates that immigration lowers the wage of competing workers: a 10 percent increase in supply reduces wages by 3 to 4 percent.
Immigration and housing rents in American cities (Link to article)
Is there a local economic impact of immigration? Immigration pushes up rents and housing values in US destination cities. The positive association of rent growth and immigrant inflows is pervasive in time series for all metropolitan areas. I use instrumental variables based on a “shift-share” of national levels of immigration into metropolitan areas. An immigration inflow equal to 1% of a city’s population is associated with increases in average rents and housing values of about 1%. The results suggest an economic impact that is an order of magnitude bigger than that found in labor markets.
Help or hindrance? The economic implications of immigration for African Americans (Link to article)
This is a collection of 14 studies by various authors on the economic implication of immigration in the United States for African Americans. “The first group [of papers] deals either directly or by implication with the impact of immigration on the labor-market outcomes experienced by African Americans and other minorities…. Immigration can affect the economic circumstances of African Americans in a variety of ways that are not directly part of the employment relationship. These include pre-labor-market effects, such as those that occur through the accumulation of knowledge in formal education; effects on non-labor-market activities, such as housing choices and criminal activities; and impacts on workers’ choices of whether to enter employment or to become self-employed instead. Part two…provides economic analyses of these other activities…. Taken all together, the results of the various research projects indicate that recent immigration to the United States appears to have exerted small negative effects on the economic situations of African Americans.
Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Link to article)
The process that has come to be called “globalization” is exposing a deep fault line between groups who have the skills and mobility to flourish in global markets and those who either don’t have these advantages or perceive the expansion of unregulated markets as inimical to social stability and deeply held norms. The result is severe tension between the market and social groups such as workers, pensioners, and environmentalists, with governments stuck in the middle. The most serious challenge for the world economy in the years ahead lies in making globalization compatible with domestic social and political stability—or to put it even more directly, in ensuring that international economic integration does not contribute to domestic social disintegration.